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The institutional design of the European Union (EU) is at the forefront of
the policy debate in Europe. Many political leaders have recently called for
a “European Constitution”, and the European Commission has launched an
”open debate” on the future of the Union. A major rethinking of Europe’s
institutions and policies is underway.
This discussion is timely. The introduction of a single currency and the
delegation of monetary powers to the European Central Bank (ECB), reforms
of high substantive and symbolic value, are seen by many as steps towards fuller
political integration. At the same time, while the prospect of integration in the
EU is fuelling enthusiasm among several countries seeking entry, the integration
process may be losing support at home. Large portions of European citizens
seem reluctant to accept further centralization in the European governance, or
at least demand that the rationale for centralization be made more explicit and
understandable. The existing EU charters fall signi…cantly short of providing a
method - let alone a detailed road map - for assigning policy prerogatives among
supranational, national and local policy authorities in the continent. Providing
a rationale for this is a key ingredient of any “constitutional phase” for Europe.
The goal of this paper is to put forth some ideas and evidence relevant to
this debate. We begin by brie‡y reviewing the theoretical arguments on how
to think about what country union should do, following recent contributions
by Alesina and Wacziarg (1999) and Alesina, Angeloni and Etro (2001a,b).
These papers focus on a trade-o¤ between the bene…ts of centralization, arising
from economies of scale or externalities, and the costs of harmonizing policies
in light of the increased heterogeneity of preferences in a large union.1 The
normative prediction of these papers is that policies where economies of scale
and/or externalities are predominant should be allocated at the union level, or
even at the world level. Instead, policy areas where heterogeneity of preferences
are high relative to externalities should be allocated to a national or sub national
level. These results are related with the vast literature on …scal federalism, as
nicely reviewed by Oates (1999). When thinking about federations of countries
like the European Union however, there are several important di¤erences. One
is that the literature on …scal federalism heavily emphasizes individual mobility
across jurisdictions, a phenomenon which applies only to a limited extent to the
European Union. The second is that the size of …scal transfers between levels
of governments within a country is much larger than those between Europe and
country members. The third is that heterogeneity of preferences across countries
is likely to be much larger than within a single country
Building on these ideas, we shift here the focus from the normative-theoretical
to the empirical side, asking the question: “what does the EU actually do?”
Does the allocation of policy prerogative between the EU and national govern-
ments satisfy the broad criteria of optimality described above?
1A similar trade-o¤ in a discussion of the size of countries is emphasized by Alesina and
Spolaore (1997).
1In order to answer these questions, we construct …rst a set of detailed numer-
ical indicators to measure the “policy involvement” of the EU in a limited but
all-encompassing set of policy domains. We …nd that the range of prerogatives
attributed to the EU has expanded considerably in recent decades, far away
from the EEC’s original mandate, particularly in the 1990s.
We then ask the question of whether the EU prerogatives have expanded
in ways which are consistent with the normative criteria we described above.
Our evidence suggests that important deviations of the EU’s action from those
criteria may have occurred. A prominent example concerns the area of social
protection. Much reluctance to further European integration among e.g. the
British public stems from the fear of having to adopt “continental style” social
welfare policies. Our results suggest that this is indeed an area in which the
EU involvement is overexpanded. Another one is sectoral policies, notably in
agriculture.
In contrast, are there areas in which EU involvement is too limited? In prin-
ciple one would think that defense and foreign relations is a policy area typically
allocated to the highest level of government. In practice, the EU has a limited
(but growing) role in these areas. Environmental protection is another area of
EU involvement that, in our framework, seems to be insu¢ciently developed.
The paper is organized as follows. First (sections 2 and 3) we de…ne our
framework of analysis and lay out the list of relevant policy domains. In section
4, we describe brie‡y the instruments and processes used by the EU to enact its
policies. In section 5 we introduce our empirical analysis giving a brief excursus
of how the EU involvement in these domains has evolved in the last 30 years.
The core of the results, regarding the role the EU presently plays in the di¤erent
domains of policies, is presented in section 6. Our overall assessment is presented
in section 7. Some caveats and directions for further research are discussed in
section 8.
2 A Framework for Assessing EU Policy Involve-
ment
2.1 Theory
Unions are collections of countries that decide together on the provision of cer-
tain public ”goods”, that a¤ect them all. ”Goods” in this context can mean
several things, including traditional public goods (like defense) and ”policies”
(e.g. a legal or regulatory framework; a single money). In the choice of the
union concerning what and how much to centralize, a trade-o¤ arises between
the bene…t of scale and the costs of heterogeneity. The most general implication
is that the EU - like any union among heterogeneous countries - should focus
exclusively on policy areas where economies of scale are large, and internalizing
externalities is important, and delegate to national or lower-level government,
the policy areas where heterogeneity of preferences is predominantly relative
to the bene…t of scale. Alesina and Wacziarg (1999) and, especially Alesina,
2Angeloni and Etro (2001a) formally address these and other related points.
The intuition of their results is simple. In a multi country union, some
policy prerogatives are subtracted from national control and allocated at the
union level. If the latter centralizes too many prerogatives, several countries
may not join because they are too distant from the “median” union member,
assuming that the chosen policy is close to the median preference. On the other
hand if the union centralizes too little, it does not fully bene…t from economy
of scales and from externalities, which motivate the creation of a union in the
…rst place.
In other words, for given distribution of preferences by potential union mem-
bers and over a diverse range of policies, in equilibrium one should observe ei-
ther small unions that centralize many prerogatives, or large unions in which
few prerogatives are delegated above national governments. This trade o¤ is
particularly important when the union is considering enlargement. According
to this reasoning, enlargement of the union and a deepening of coordination
of policies are contradictory if the new members and the incumbents are het-
erogeneous. How the union would choose along this trade o¤ depends on the
voting rules within the union. This is why the discussion about what a union
should do is deeply linked to the constitutional issues concerning ”who decides
what and how”. Alesina, Angeloni and Etro (2001a) discuss the possibility of a
centralization bias in the union. If the prerogative of the union are not de…ned
ex ante by constitutional design, when the union is formed the members close
to the ”median” have an incentive to increase centralization and harmonization.
Anticipating this tendency, potential members will stay out to begin with, lead-
ing to unions that are ”too small”. A union where prerogatives are …xed ex ante
leads to superior outcomes.
From an empirical stand-point, government functions obviously do not neatly
line upon a scale from high to low economy of scale, high to low externality, high
to low heterogeneity of preferences. Only in some cases, is the judgement rather
obvious. Think of international trade, with large externalities, and educational
choices in local schools, where heterogeneity of preferences are critical. In many
other cases the choice is less clear cut; think of …scal policy, for instance. This
is why, in practice, the allocation problem is complex.
An interesting case, in this respect, concerns a special type of public policy:
redistribution. The latter has an “economy of scale” aspect: income redistri-
butions across countries can occur only at the union level. The heterogeneity
of preferences, depending on di¤erent income level, are also rather obvious and
strong. In fact, the reluctance to expand the budget of EU may stem also from
the fact that wealthier countries (and regions) in Europe do not want to exces-
sively subsidize poor regions. The small size of these …scal redistributions is
also often mentioned as a problem for the EU single currency area, e.g. relative
to the US.
Optimally, then, one should think of policy allocation as a choice on the
preferred position in the trade o¤ just explained. From a “positive” point of
view, however, several additional politico-economic forces come into place. In
particular, competing bureaucracies may not be willing to easily give up respon-
3sibilities. Standard theories of bureaucracies2 argue that bureaucrats derive
prestige from the size of their in‡uence in various policy domains. Bureaucra-
cies at di¤erent levels of government will then compete over the allocation of
responsibilities. If this is the case, several outcomes are possible. For example,
this game may lead to an excessive centralization in policy areas in which the
supranational bureaucracy has been successful in gaining prerogatives. Or, on
the contrary, national bureauracies may be successful in resisting delegation of
functions to the union. The point is that one should not expect necessarily an
e¢cient outcome from this non-cooperative game. Note that these arguments
apply to all levels of government, from a city council to the EU. In this paper,
however, we focus exclusively on the allocation issue between EU and national
governments.
2.2 Empirics
On which policy areas does the European Union mainly concentrate? Answering
this question is not easy.
One should be able to determine the policy prerogatives of the EU insti-
tutions - and as a complement those belonging to other government levels -
directly from the EU Treaties. Constitutional charters are intended to lay out
the criteria for the allocation of power, their limits, checks and balances, etc.
However, the EU Treaties do not provide an exhaustive guide on whether, and
on the basis of what principles, policy powers fall within or outside the realm of
EU powers. Their complexity and generality make it di¢cult for anybody, even
somebody informed, to grasp the degree of e¤ective presence of EU institutions
in the relevant areas of policy-making.
If one takes an extensive interpretation of the Treaties, the EU seems to
have some say in almost all policy areas. This is, by itself, a problem, because it
potentially opens the door for an excessive attribution of responsibilities in too
many areas and it also weakens accountability. However, the mention of a given
policy chapter in the Treaties does not mean that the EU e¤ectively exercises
policy-making power in that area, and conversely the EU takes concrete action
in areas only vaguely mentioned in the Treaties. In short: whether the EU
is active in a given …eld and how important such presence is, is a question
that cannot be answered by consulting the Treaties alone. Other information is
necessary.
Unfortunately, the literature is also of little help. Despite extensive explo-
ration by political scientists,3 we are aware of no attempt to rigorously weigh
and compare the involvement of the EU in its key policy domains4. Using the
available information, provided mainly through EU on-line services, we derive
2See W. Niskanen (1971).
3A useful reference is Nugent (1999). His vast bibliography covers the relevant political
science literature on the subject. see also McCormick (2000).
4After writing this paper we became aware of the work by Pollack (2000), whose empirical
approach is similar to ours. His conclusions – that EU regulatory action has ”continued
its relentless growth throughout the last four decades”, whereas budget spending has been
contained – are consistent with ours.
4simple quantitative measures of the EU involvement across policy areas.5 We
accomplish this using a very simple method: we count the number of legal,
judiciary, and other non-binding acts (“policy acts”) emanating from the EU,
classi…ed across broadly homogeneous policy …elds, and assembling the results
from various sources into summary indicators.
Our approach has advantages and drawbacks. The key advantages of simple
counting are transparency and objectivity. The disadvantage is that individual
policy acts can be more or less in‡uential. If these di¤erences are randomly
distributed across policy chapters, however, one can rely on the law of large
numbers to mitigate the problem (the available sample sizes are indeed very
large, as we shall see).
3 Domains of EU Policy-Making
We have sketched our classi…cation of policy domains having two requirements
in mind. First, each domain should be broadly homogeneous in terms of the
concepts highlighted by the theory. Second, our list of domains should re‡ect
some basic institutional and historical features of the EU. This is necessary to
make e¢cient use of the existing information and to understand the origins and
the motivations of the EU role in certain …elds. It must be mentioned that
the policy domains do not exhaust the range of activities carried out by the
EU, mainly because the former does not include internal administration (which
absorbs a lot of resources, as we shall see). Therefore, throughout our analysis
we have excluded from our consideration all internal administrative acts.6
3.1 Nine Policy Domains
For our purpose, we identify the following 9 policy domains:7
International Trade. The most important area of EU policy-making,
the closest to the original raison d’être of the European Communities, is the
creation of a common market with a common external trade policy. We distin-
guish between external trade provisions (covered under this heading) and the
policies aimed at the establishment of the common internal market (grouped in
the following heading). External trade provisions cover both the international
agreements between the EU and third countries, and the provisions aimed at
establishing uniform trade and tari¤ policies with non-member countries.
5Most of the documentation elaborated for this paper is available on the European Union
website (http://europa.eu.int/). We are grateful to C. Nicasi of the EU Commission for
advising us on the use of Celex, our source of EU legal acts.
6This means implicitly assuming that resources devoted to administration can be allocated
to the domains pro-quota. This is a convenient, but not necessarily a good assumption. In
some instances it is probably not justi…ed, since as we will see below the policy production
process seems to be more resource-e¢cient in certain areas than in others.
7An Annex Table explains in detail how all the EU policy actions have been grouped into
the 9 categories.
5Most would agree that there are sizeable bene…ts from free trade at the
global level. This implies a high degree of policy harmonization, again at the
global level, directed towards the removal of trade barriers. A free trade area,
with common external trade policy, is obviously a second best solution. It is
welfare improving only if the common external policy is consistent with free
trade principles. With this important proviso, economic arguments speak in
favor of a clear EU-wide assignment of trade and common market legislation.
Common Market. The EU common market policies are a natural com-
plement of a common external trade policy, and equally close to the original
purpose of the Community. The Common market legislation chapter includes
a variety of provisions promoting the free internal movement of goods, services,
capital and people. This covers all acts aimed at harmonization/approximation
and mutual acceptance of national provisions so that obstacles to such move-
ments are removed. From a normative viewpoint, however, the exact role of
this type of legislation within the context of the Single Market is ambiguous.
On the one side, a certain degree of harmonization of domestic laws is necessary
to guarantee a level playing …eld for intra-area trade. On the other side harmo-
nization may at times go beyond what strictly required for this purpose, thus
becoming an infringement, rather than a support, of free area-wide competition.
Money and Finance. In our de…nition, this broad area includes monetary
and exchanges rate policy, payments systems and …nancial market regulation
and legislation, bank supervision, …scal and tax policies, etc. Though not being
one of the tasks addressed by the EEC founding fathers from the start, uni…-
cation of money and …nancial markets was always in the background and was
soon recognized as complement of the Single Market.8 With the creation of the
ECB (1998) and the introduction of the euro (1999), this turned out to be one
of the most active and successful policy chapters in the history of the EU.
On the bene…ts and costs stemming from integration of money and …nance,
the prescriptions from economic theory are rather mixed. On money, the theory
of Optimum Currency Areas provides a clear framework for the international al-
location of policy responsibilities.9 The empirical evidence on optimal currency
areas is controversial, though in the case of the euro-area the balance tends
to tilt in favor.10 Payments systems regulation is closely linked to monetary
policy. For bank and …nancial regulation and supervision, the elements of the
trade-o¤ are rather clear. The economies of scale inherent in gathering super-
visory information and the international spillovers of …nancial fragility speak in
favor of centralization, whereas the …scal elements built into the provision of
lending-of-last-resort may suggest allocation at a “lower” geographical level.11
8A point forcefully made by Padoa-Schioppa (1987).
9See Mundell (1961) for the path breaking contribution and Alesina and Barro (2002) for
recent work.
10For a recent survey see Kenen (2001).
11This is one of the rare cases where the EU advocates decentralisation; see EU (2000). An
opposite view is taken by Danthine et al. (1999).
6On the whole, however, the drive towards integration of …nancial markets is a
powerful stimulus to supranational ruling. As to …scal policies, responsibility
of the EU versus national governments is very controversial. Inroads into na-
tional responsibility have been made in the co-ordination and harmonization of
budget balances and …scal surveillance. But …scal policies ultimately remain
national responsibility although the growth and stability part implies an im-
portant constraint on the national budget. Whether or not this constraint is
useful, necessary or an infringement on national sovereignty is debatable. The
EU has a vaguely speci…ed role in the co-ordination of taxation and certain
limited spending responsibilities. Here again, the judgement on the economics
of EU involvement is mixed.12
Education, Research and Culture. This policy chapter focuses on youth
policies, research, technology, preservation of the cultural heritage, etc. Though
not included in the original EEC Treaty, this area developed considerably in sub-
sequent times. On economic grounds, the gains from international co-ordination
are vague at best. On the one side, the externality element in this policy domain
could potentially be large. There is also a general interest in the spreading and
communication of knowledge across frontiers, but this can simply be achieved
with free circulation of individuals and ideas. It is also likely to be an area in
which local preferences and backgrounds have a predominant weight.
Environment. This is an area where international - indeed global - exter-
nalities are important: pollution of the seas and global warming are just two
obvious examples. An involvement of the EU as regards EU-wide externali-
ties seems therefore desirable. There may also be …xed costs (e.g. research)
and economies of scale in the setting of environmental policies. However, much
environmental e¤ects are local or regional (garbage, river pollution). The preser-
vation of territory and the enforcement of environmental policies are likely to
have also a strong “local” component (local communities are the …rst, though
ultimately not the only, to su¤er from a deterioration of environmental condi-
tions).
Business Relations (Sectoral). We divide the area of Business Relations
in two compartments. The …rst - Sectoral - is very well de…ned and includes
all policies designed to a¤ect the behavior and performance of the economic
producing sectors. In the subsequent analysis, we further break down this into
three sub-areas, Agriculture (and …shing), Industry (with energy) and Trans-
port. Agricultural policy is one of the oldest and most active policy chapters
since the origins of the EEC, though its justi…cations on e¢ciency grounds have
long and convincingly been challenged. Other sectoral policies could provide
public goods, for example, if they support an EU wide transportation and com-
munication network. However, sectoral policies do not necessarily provide such
public goods. They could even be used to delay the completion of the internal
12A critique of EU …scal coordination (beyond the Stability and Growth Pact) is contained
in Alesina et al. (2001).
7market (as might be feared, for example, in energy and postal services). All
together we are sceptical on the need for such sectoral policies at the EU level.
Business Relations (Non-Sectoral). This broad area encompasses un-
dertaking laws, market competition and state subsidies. Antitrust has a growing
global dimension, which re‡ects market globalization. The importance of main-
taining competition at the EU level to promote the functioning of the internal
market is re‡ected in the EU’s mandate in this area. However, the fact that
only large mergers/acquisitions are under EU scrutiny takes into account that
only such mergers/acquisitions can have implications for competition in the EU
as a whole and should hence be dealt with at that level. As regards subsidies
and state aid, the logic of EU involvement is similar because such government
policies could undermine the level playing …eld in the common market. On this
basis, EU involvement in these domains seems economically sensible.
International Relations. This includes foreign policy, defence, and foreign
aid. In principle, there may be signi…cant economies of scale and externalities
to be exploited in foreign policy and defence, provided geo-political interests are
similar.13 This leaves an ambiguous picture about the desirable EU involvement,
but some involvement on foreign policy is desirable. As for foreign aid there is
no externality or economy of scale, while there is heterogeneity of preferences.
Citizen and Social Protection. This encompasses home a¤airs, justice,
consumer protection, civil rights, health, labor relations, etc. It also includes the
important Social Cohesion chapter, with the attached structural and regional
funds. Just as for education and culture, important elements of local/national
preferences are likely to be dominant. Given the high standards of social protec-
tion existing in all EU countries, a strong EU involvement in this area is highly
questionable. As to structural and regional funds, there may be important
distributional reasons justifying EU activity. From an e¢ciency perspective,
however, they are much harder to justify. Heterogeneity of preferences in re-
distributive policies are likely to be very large, and highly correlated with per
capita income.
3.2 Preferences on policy devolution
We have summarised the considerations just expressed in a set of ”judgements”
concerning the desirable allocation of policy responsibilities (Table 1). These
judgements are tentative and, though re‡ecting our best understanding of the
underlying trade-o¤s, are subjective and hence potentially biased. In section 7,
we will use them as a working assumption to guide our reading of the empirical
13It should be noted, however, that defence is already largely part of the supranational
NATO umbrella.
8evidence concerning the actual involvement of the EU in the policy domains. Be-
fore getting there, however, it is interesting to see how our judgements compare
with the ones of the European citizens.
A broad ranging survey of the Europeans’ opinions concerning the assign-
ment of policies in the Union is beyond the scope of this paper. Hence, we
have only looked at the most readily available information. We have used
Eurobarometer (Spring 2001 issue), a publication of the EU Commission con-
taining the results of an opinion poll, focused on the role and the policies of the
European Union. Eurobarometer is a public opinion survey conducted, twice
a year, face-to-face with a representative sample of individuals in each mem-
ber state. An identical set of questions is asked 1000 people in each member
state14. The main drawback of this opinion survey is its very limited sample
size. A key advantage from our viewpoint is the fact that some of the ques-
tions focus exactly on the set of issues we are interested in. We concentrated
our attention on section 5.1 of Eurobarometer, in which survey respondents are
asked whether, for each of 25 policy areas, they ”think that the decisions should
be made by the [own] government, or made jointly with the European Union”.
Answers are published in percent (N=decisions should be national; S=decisions
should be shared; U=uncertain; N+S+U=100). We have grouped the 25 areas
on broader areas consistent with our earlier classi…cation (see footnotes to Table
2 for details).
Unfortunately, not all our previously de…ned policy areas are included in
the survey, so we have no information to report on some areas. Among the 25
policy areas considered, 15 refer to the broad area that we have called Citizen
and social protection; hence, we have in Table 2 provided a further breakdown of
this broad area in …ve sub-areas: 9a (Migration); 9b (Crime-local); 9c (Crime-
global); 9d (Health and social welfare); 9e (Unemployment, social exclusion and
regional aid)15. Each cell of Table 2 reports, for each policy area, the (integer
of the) balance of the answers calculated as follows: [(S ¡N)¢(1¡U/100)]. We
multiply (S ¡ N) by (1 ¡ U/100) so that the balance receives a lower weight
if the share of uncertain respondents is large. Hence, the larger the number in
each cell of Table 2 is, the stronger the (percent) number of people that have
expressed a preference for a ”Shared” responsibility, weighted for the undecided.
The maximum (minimum) theoretical entry in each cell is 100 (-100), meaning
an unanimous preference for Shared (National).
In interpreting these data, two caveats are in order. First, the exact mean-
ing of ”Shared” is unclear; di¤erent interpretations by respondents in di¤erent
countries cannot be ruled out. Second, the responses to certain questions (for
example: regional aid) could be biased in certain countries by the presumption
that transferring policy responsibility to the EU may result in net bene…ts for
14See all technical details in: http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo/eb.html.
15The sub-areas include Eurobarometer questions as follows(in italics, name of category in
brackets): immigration policy, political asylum, accepting refugees, exploitation of human be-
ings (migration); police, justice, urban crime, juvenile crime (crime-local); organised crime,
drugs (crime-global); health and social welfare (same category); unemployment, social exclu-
sion and regional aid (same category).
9those countries. In other words, the response to the questionnaire may re‡ect
the perception of personal or country gains rather than a fair judgement about
the optimality of allocative criteria.
Nonetheless, in the main, our own conjectures concerning the proper alloca-
tion of policy areas seem con…rmed by the survey. The (unweighted) mean across
countries reveals that Money and …nance, Environment and International rela-
tions and foreign aid receive a positive value (Shared), whereas Education, re-
search and culture and Agriculture have a negative one (National). Very diverse
opinions are expressed on the …ve sub-areas belonging to Citizen and social pro-
tection: Crime-local and Health and social welfare are viewed to be ”National”,
whereas Migration, Crime-global and Unemployment, social exclusion and re-
gional aid are judged to be areas of ”Shared” responsibility. However, as noted
earlier, we suspect that on the latter area the data reported by Eurobarometer
may be biased. Also interesting is the fact that there are signi…cant di¤erences
across countries and domains. Denmark, Portugal, the United Kingdom and
the Scandinavian countries seem the most EU sceptic while Italy, Belgium and
the Netherlands are most supportive of a strong EU role.
In the last column of Table 2 we report the results of a di¤erent aggregation
of the country preferences. The column shows how many votes a proposal to
centralize a policy domain would (hypothetically) get if member governments
were to vote in the European Council according to the outcome of Eurobarom-
eter. In other words, we assume that Council members of countries with a
majority of voters in favor of a strong EU role on certain issues (a positive
number in their respective cells of Table 2) would vote in favor. A negative
number would imply a negative vote by Council members. We then aggregate
the country preferences using the current allocation of votes in the Council.
The …gures in the last column of Table 2 suggest that a shared EU role …nds
a simple majority of Council votes (currently, Council votes total 87) in Money
and …nance, Environment, International relations, and certain aspects of Citizen
and social protection (Crime-global, Migration, Unemployment, social exclusion
and regional aid). EU involvement would receive unanimous support in only one
domain: the …ght against organized crime (Crime-global). Centralization in the
other domains except Migration would get a quali…ed majority of Council votes
(at least 62 out of 87). Policies on Education, research and culture, Agriculture,
Crime-local and Health and social welfare would be voted to be undertaken at
the national level.
In summary, the evidence from the Eurobarometer shows that the prefer-
ences of European citizens regarding the allocation of functions between Europe
and member countries is remarkably similar to our judgement based on the pre-
dictions of theoretical models. We …nd this comforting.
4 Instruments and processes of EU policy
We now need to make a brief detour on the instruments and processes used
by the EU to formulate and to enact its policies, as some understanding of
10it is necessary to tackle the data analysis that follows. This section o¤ers a
short “primer” on the nature of the legal instruments and the processes of EU
policymaking.16
4.1 The Treaties
The primary source of law and policy-making power in the EU are the Treaties.
New treaties are negotiated at so-called Intergovernmental Conferences and need
to be rati…ed by all member governments. Together with their annexes and Pro-
tocols, the Treaties constitute the ultimate source of mandate and legitimacy
for all EU institutions and for all their legislative and judicial authority. How-
ever, important initiatives can occasionally arise in the EU context that have
no origin, or even mention, in the Treaties.17
More frequent are cases in which important policy chapters have only a
tenuous or very general basis in the letter of the Treaties (e.g., transport).
In other cases, explicit Treaty provision remain either inoperative or at least
hardly developed, perhaps for many years, until the conditions for concrete
action materialize.
Conversely, cases exist as well in which the letter of the Treaty has a direct
and immediate application. For example, the Treaty-based goal of price stability
has become a cornerstone of the ECB’s monetary policy.18
4.2 Secondary Legislation and Non-Binding Acts
Secondary legislation comprises a broad and di¤erentiated range of binding and
non-binding legal instruments. There are three principal categories of binding
legal acts.
1. Regulations contain general provisions, fully binding vis-à-vis all parties in
all member states. They are directly applicable without need for national
implementation.
2. Directives are binding vis-à-vis all member states addressed. They specify
the results to be achieved but leave member states the choice of form
and methods to implement them. They need not apply to all member
states (although they usually do) and are rather general, often specifying
outcomes that national measures are supposed to attain.
3. Decisions are binding vis-à-vis all parties addressed. They may be ad-
dressed to one, several or all parties or member states. They can be very
speci…c, like administrative acts, or rather general.
16For a more complete and extensive discussion see Peterson and Bomberg (1999) and
Nugent (1999) and the references cited there.
17An example was the set up, in 1979, of the European Monetary System, as a result of an
informal agreement between heads of state.
18See Issing et al. (2001)
11In addition, the EU Commission issues a number of “softer” acts, or doc-
uments, of non-binding nature. Occasionally, particularly when new policy ini-
tiatives are envisaged, the Commission publishes White Papers to outline their
legislative strategies.19
Legislation in the EU is typically initiated and prepared by the Commission,
who can also sign legislative acts. Before the Maastricht Treaty, other legislative
acts were signed by the Council alone. Pressures from the European Parliament
have resulted in the so-called co-decision procedure, where the Parliament also
has to sign (and with its refusal can veto) certain acts. Since the Amsterdam
Treaty, only agriculture, justice, home a¤airs, trade, …scal harmonization and
EMU issues are largely outside the control of the European Parliament, although
admittedly these are among the most important dossiers.
4.3 Enforcement via the Court of Justice
The EU Court of Justice20 has the double important mandate of interpreting EU
law and to seek its application and enforcement. Court cases can be initiated
by governments and private agents, including sta¤ of the EU agencies.
Contrary to Anglo-Saxon practice, judicial rulings do not have legal status
in the EU; but the in‡uence of the Court in giving content to existing legislation
and making it e¤ective is considerable. Acting on the initiative of EU bodies,
member states, or private parties, the Court rules using as a basis the entire EU
legislation (Treaties, Directives, Regulations, etc.) and its deliberations have a
key in‡uence on how such legislation is interpreted and applied. The in‡uence
of the EU judiciary is enhanced decisively by the fact that European law now
“breaks” national law and European Court of Justice rulings “break” national
Court decisions.
4.4 International Agreements
The EU also negotiates international agreements of three types. Trade agree-
ments including preferential agreements are based on the mandate on interna-
tional trade policy (e.g. WTO agreements). Trade and co-operation agreements
include the granting of trade preferences and assistance mainly for development
reasons. Finally association agreements (e.g. with Mediterranean countries)
grant reciprocal rights and obligations typically beyond trade.
4.5 The ECB
The responsibilities and prerogatives of the ECB in the sphere of monetary pol-
icy are, in comparison to other policy areas, very clearly de…ned in the Treaties
19The Common Market project started out as a White Paper before it became a binding
strategy in the Single European Act. So-called Green Papers are Commission reports that
aim at in‡uencing the public debate.
20For simplicity, Court of Justice for us is intended to include also the Court of First
Instance. Created in 1989, the latter has progressively complemented the main Court by
issuing …rst instance judgements on a number relatively simpler cases.
12and well documented in the literature.21 There is thus no need to go into de-
tails here. From our viewpoint it should be noted, however, that monetary
policy making is conducted within a di¤erent institutional framework than that
of other policies. The Maastricht Treaty de…ned the main features of EMU and
its objective of price stability (Article 105). The Eurosystem, comprising the
ECB and national central banks adopting the euro, determines and implements
monetary policies via the ECB Governing Council and Executive Board. The
ECB decision-making bodies are independent in their task i.e. not subject to
in‡uence or approval by other EU or national bodies.
5 The Expansion of EU Legislation, 1971-2000
We present some summary data on the expansion of EU policy activity in the
last 30 years in Tables 3, 4 and 5. We have divided this period in six 5-year sub-
periods. For each of them, we show the number of legal acts (of various sorts,
including binding and non-binding), judiciary acts and international agreements,
that emanated from the EU over the period. The tables include all acts, i.e. also
those that have subsequently been repealed and are no longer in force today.
Hence, the data are intended to describe the policy making activity that has
taken place during each sub-period, independently of the degree to which such
activity has been relevant in shaping the EU policies as they are today (we shall
look at this aspect later). For comparison, we have also added summary data
on the size of the EU budget.
The sharp increase in the production of EU secondary legislation in the
3-decade period stands out clearly in Table 3. We …nd everywhere a similar
increase in activity, but to di¤erent degrees. On the whole, the number of
legislative acts and Court decisions increased three to sevenfold between the
early 1970s and the late 1990s. If one considers just the acts of secondary
legislation, the total output in 1996-2000 was 11414 acts - that is, a yearly
average of well over 2000 among regulations, directives and decisions. This
represents a slight decrease from the previous 5 years but a fourfold increase
relative to 1971-75. The bulk of the increase took place between 1971 and 1990.
While the production of legal acts has been roughly stable since the late 1980s,
the upward trend has continued for Court activity. The picture for international
agreements is similar.
By contrast, the direct …scal role has grown only slowly and has remained
very limited. EU expenditure as a share of GDP and relative to national public
spending has increased somewhat, but minimally in respect to the legislative
and Court activity. It also remains very low in absolute terms - i.e., if one
compares with the size of government spending in any existing example of federal
government. EU expenditure rose from 0.4% of GDP in 1975 to 1.1% in 2000.
Relative to national budget share of near 40% of GDP in the early 1970s and
21See Issing et al. (2001). The legal pro…les of the ECB are examined in Zilioli and Selmayr
(2000).
13near 50% of GDP in the late 1990s, spending has also increased but more slowly,
especially over the past decade.
Table 4 focuses on the total of regulations, directives and decisions. Again,
acts subsequently repealed are included. We break down the data by policy
chapter, and consider both the total number of acts for each chapter and its
share relative to the total. In this way, we can measure the relative role each
policy domain has played in the total of EU policymaking.
International trade and agriculture feature the bulk of the EU’s legislative
activity over the past 30 years. More surprising is the low and relatively stable
share of common market-related acts until the second half of the 1990s. This is
partly explained as the result of mutual recognition rather than harmonization
as the guiding principle of this process and the strong increase in legislation in
other policy areas. Moreover, as we shall see later, a large amount of secondary
legislation in this area takes place in the form of directives, thus leaving the
implementation to national authorities.
Another key feature is that the share of the “classic” EU domains, inter-
national and intra-EU trade and agriculture, fell from 80 per cent in the early
1970s to less than 65 percent by the late 1990s. The growing role of the EU
in international relations and foreign aid, citizens and social protection (from
second half of 1980s), money and …nance (late 1990s), environment and non-
sectoral business policies, education, research and culture (all 1990s) is clearly
shown in the table. Only transport and industry/energy do not exhibit signi…-
cant increases over the past two decades. All this shows the broadening of the
scope of activity of the EU.
In Table 5 we have assembled the data on the non-binding acts and docu-
ments. We …nd it interesting to document also these “softer” forms of policy,
since in many cases they are used to lay tentative ground for successive more
binding forms of policy. The growth in the number of recommendations and
opinions, as well as “white” and “green” papers, is particularly sharp in the
1990s. Common market and business relations take the lion’s share, but it is
noteworthy that a sharp increase took place also in two more peripheral areas,
i.e., education, research and culture and citizen and social protection.
6 Where We Now Stand: EU Presence Across
Policy Domains
6.1 Basic Data
We now move from past evolution to the present, looking in some detail at the
today’s EU policy involvement in our policy domains via Treaties, legislation,
the Court and subordinate measures.
Table 6 focuses on the role of the Treaties. Such role is measured, across the
policy domains, by the degree of detail devoted to each of them, approximated
by the number of articles or the number of words (for details on the breakdown
of the Treaties into policy domains, see the annex table). Some policy chapters
14that are clearly of key importance, such as agriculture or business relations
(non-sectoral), have little mention in the Treaties. International trade has also
relatively little weight, despite its full centralization at the EU level.22 Other
domains, like common market or money and …nance (the latter, particularly
after Maastricht) are heavily present. A surprisingly large share of articles and
words (almost one quarter of the combined Articles of the Treaties) are devoted
to the citizen and social protection chapter. International relations also covers
a large share (mainly due to its presence in the EU Treaty). The ECSC and
Euratom treaties give rise to a large presence to sectoral policies on “industry
and energy” in the Treaties.
Tables 7 looks at total legislation in force today, showing the acts signed by
all signatories by policy chapter. Two …ndings seem important. Again agricul-
ture is coming out on top of the list in terms of the number of legal acts passed,
followed by trade, common market and business non-sectoral. Education, en-
vironment, industry, transport, international relations and citizens and social
protection come out as less important.
Tables 6 and 7 together suggest that there is a certain substitutability be-
tween Treaties and secondary legislation as vehicles for enacting policy. Both
the common market and the money and …nance domain are extensively rep-
resented in the Treaties, but feature less prominently in secondary legislation.
International trade, by contrast, has less provisions in the Treaties but features
more prominently in secondary legislation (and, as indicated below, in interna-
tional treaties). Similarly, non-sectoral business relations are more prominent in
secondary legislation than in the Treaties. We will take this into account when
constructing the summary indicators.
Table 8 displays the Court of Justice activity by policy chapter. Data limita-
tions forced us to restrict ourselves to the period between June 1997 and March
2001. The Court of Justice is only asked for an opinion or a judgement if the
EU has an important presence in the corresponding area. The “front-runners”
of previous tables, trade, common market and agriculture, also generate nu-
merous Court cases. In addition, the Court had to decide on many taxation
related cases and in non-sectoral business relations. It is hardly surprising that
Education and research and culture are virtually absent from the Court, but
also industry and energy play a very limited role in the Courts as in secondary
legislation, despite their important role in the Treaties. On the contrary, the
citizens and social protection chapter generate a large amount of Court activity.
Table 9 assembles various other indicators, including international agree-
ments, non binding acts, as well as the sta¢ng of the EU Commissions and the
level of spending in the EU budget, all broken down by policy area. Interna-
tional agreements are mainly negotiated in international trade (about 80% of
the total), whereas agriculture and international relations make up for almost
all of the remaining 20%. Recommendations and opinions, Green Papers and
White Papers show, as already seen in an earlier table, a signi…cant coverage
22The full centralisation is re‡ected also in the fact that trade negotiations in the context
of the WTO are conducted by the EU rather than be national delegations.
15of non-traditional policy areas, such as citizen and social protection. They can
serve to justify sta¢ng and budgets and show readiness to take on and centralize
other policy responsibilities in the future.
The …nal two columns of the table reveal some familiar and some surpris-
ing facts as well. As well known, most of the EU budget goes into agriculture
and regional and structural funds (here under citizen and social protection).
These areas do not, however, correspond to those in which the Commission is
most heavily sta¤ed. By contrast, some of the policy domains with the main
legislative activity are surprisingly modestly sta¤ed. International trade, com-
mon market, non-sectoral business and even agriculture only account for a few
percent each of total sta¤. Education and international relations and foreign
aid seem rather favorably equipped with manpower. Administration (which in-
cludes notably Personnel/Administration and translation services) account for
an astonishing 44 percent of the total Commission sta¤ of 23000. In addition,
the other institutions (notably the Parliament) employ another 9000 sta¤.23
6.2 Summary Indicators
The elementary indicators presented so far provide a somewhat fragmented pic-
ture of the intensity of EU policy involvement in each policy area. Moreover,
each elementary indicator can be misleading because it measures such involve-
ment from a speci…c angle and can be a¤ected by measurement problems. As-
sembling all evidence into summary indicators can thus help us get a clearer
overall sense of the results. To construct them, we proceed in two steps. First,
we compile semi-aggregate indicators of policy involvement (broken down by do-
mains) for each of the three main channels of policy making, i.e., the Treaties,
the secondary legislation and the Court. Second, we combine these into overall
indicators of policy involvement, using speci…c aggregation criteria. All results
are presented in Table 10.
The …rst three columns present the semi-aggregate indicators on EU in-
volvement via Treaties, secondary legislation and Court activity, respectively.
In practice, we standardize all earlier detailed indicators for each of the chan-
nels - i.e., (i) Treaty articles and words; (ii) regulations, directives, decisions;
(iii) Court decisions and opinions - in Tables 6-8 by dividing each cell by the
column mean. In this way, attention is restricted exclusively to the relative
weights across policy domains: the information on the absolute values of the
elementary indicators is lost. Subsequently, we take the arithmetic means of the
elementary indicators for each channel. This yields the three semi-aggregate in-
dicators, referring respectively to the Treaties, to secondary legislation, and to
Court activity. By construction, each of them has mean equal to one.
The three indicators assume quite di¤erent values for each policy domain.
This supports the view that EU action in each …eld tends to take place through
a di¤erent mix of policy instruments. For example, international trade and agri-
cultural policies are enacted mainly through secondary legislation, with some
23By comparison, in Germany, the Parliament, Bundestag and Bundesrat, employ a total
of 2300 and 190 sta¤ respectively.
16support from the Court; the direct input from the Treaty is minor. On the con-
trary, in the areas of money and …nance and citizen and social protection the
Treaty plays a greater role than secondary legislation; the Court is again impor-
tant here. In general, the contribution of the Court (as measured by the third
semi-aggregated index) tends to be characterized by lower variability across pol-
icy domains than the legislative. In turn, the …rst two are negatively correlated
across policy domains, thereby seemingly con…rming their complementarily. All
this strengthens our earlier conjecture that there is substitutability between
Treaty and secondary legislation as policy vehicles. The Court activity is pos-
itively correlated with both the legislative and the Treaty (though the second
coe¢cient is very small). In our interpretation, it should be instead be seen
rather as a complement of the …rst two.24
We then proceed to aggregate this information further. We use the produc-
tion function analogy to construct three alternative indicators characterized, by
construction, by di¤erent elasticities of substitutions among the basic indica-
tors. They are, respectively, the arithmetic mean, a (mixed) geometric mean,
and a so-called “Leontief” mean constructed as follows (and normalized to have
mean equal one):
I1 = (i1 + i2 + i3)=3 Arithmetic mean;
I1 =
p
[(i1 + i2)=2]i3 (Mixed) geometric mean;
I3 = minf[(i1 + i2)=2]; i3)g “Leontief” mean.
The …rst one assumes that the EU policy services (the “output”) are pro-
vided with a production technology that is linear in the three “inputs,” i1 (the
Treaties), i2 (secondary legislation) and i3 (Court activity). The second in-
dex uses the same technology for the …rst two inputs, while the …rst two and
the third are aggregated using a Cobb Douglas technology. In the latter, the
elasticity of substitution is constant and unitary, which implies that the rate of
substitution between (i1 + i2)/2 and i3 decreases as the use of i3 increases. This
expresses the idea that the pair of inputs (i1 + i2)/2 and i3 are to some extent
complementary. In the third index, we push this idea further by assuming that
the production technology is of Leontief type: there is no substitution at all
between (i1 + i2)/2 and i3 and the “output” is determined by the most scarce
“input”. Finally, we also calculate a rank indicator, equal to the mean of the
ranks of i1, i2 and i3.
The summary indicators provide a measure of the relative degree of involve-
ment of the EU in the policy areas. Focusing on the arithmetic mean …rst,
there are …ve areas where the indicator comes out larger than unity (call this
“upper group”): in decreasing order they are Agriculture (way above all oth-
ers), Common market, Business (non-sectoral), Citizen and social protection,
24The data are as follows: standard deviation of the three columns, in order: .7, 1.3 and
.8. The correlation coe¢cient between the …rst two is equal to -.33, between the second two
.53. The positive correlation between Treaty and Court is just .00032. The number of cases
in which the Court rules only on the basis of the Treaties appears therefore to be limited.
17International trade. Industry, Money and …nance and International relations
are close to average (the latter somewhat lower). The “lower group” includes,
in increasing order from the bottom, Education, Transport, Environment.
The other two types of mean provide some important quali…cations to this
ranking. First and foremost, the index value of Industry falls sharply if one
moves from the arithmetic to the geometric mean, and even more to the Leon-
tief mean. This re‡ects the fact that the sections of the Treaties relating to
Industry (mainly Coal and Steel and Euratom Treaties) are not backed by cor-
responding secondary legislation and even less by Court activity. We are inclined
to interpret this as meaning that EU policy in this area is not really operative.
Second, the position of International trade and Common market within the
“upper group” is strengthened further. On the contrary, the weight of Inter-
national relations decreases signi…cantly and moves towards the “lower group”.
We regard this result with some special caution, however, since Court activity
may be less relevant for this particular policy chapter. Finally, in the “lower
group,” Education is reduced even further, while Transport and Environment
remain roughly unchanged.
The rank indicator basically con…rms all these judgements. We just note
that, among the more borderline cases, the position of International relations
is somewhat strengthened by the rank indicator.
7 Assessment
We now look at the …ndings of the quantitative analysis in the light of the
normative claims as to the desirable policy allocation suggested in section 3. To
facilitate comparison, we have inserted a summary of the evidence, coming from
the summary indicators just reviewed, in the earlier table. This yields Table 11.
In the table, we have highlighted in bold the areas in which we …nd rel-
ative clearer evidence of discrepancy between our ”normative” priors and the
evidence. We shall turn to these areas later. Let us …rst review the other ones,
on which there appears to be broad consistency between the two.
The key historical functions of the EU - International trade and Common
market - seem on the whole to be properly allocated. The EU role is large on
both, and rightly so. While there seem to be no doubt whether the EU should
have a dominant role in these areas, there may be an issue of how such a role
is performed. Though the analysis of this paper does not have much to say in
this, it is worth recalling two caveats.
First, a free trade area is consistent with sound economic principles, provided
its external trade policy is also consistent with them. Second, common market
legislation should aim at ensuring e¤ective mobility of goods, services, capital
and people in the Single Market area, but does not need to go beyond that.
Top-down harmonization of national practices can be equally at odds with eco-
nomic principles as impediments to trade are. Free trade promotes welfare by
allowing countries and regions to specialize while respecting local practices and
preferences. In recent years, this principle seems to have been given increasing
18weight within the context of EU common market policies.
Money and …nance is a heterogeneous area, within which quite di¤erent
considerations apply. The existence of a single European currency, the argu-
ments and evidence in support of which we regard as convincing, requires a
signi…cant area-wide centralization of this policy domain not only in the strict
…eld of monetary policy, but also in related areas such as payments systems,
money market infrastructures, etc. Financial market integration is gradually
but powerfully pushing towards increasing area-wide co-ordination of supervi-
sory practices and …nancial market policies. In the areas of budget policies and
taxation, the two current issues regard budget co-ordination (beyond the Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact) and tax harmonization. Our analysis in this paper does
not have speci…c implications for these debates.25 On the whole, however, we
see no reason to regard an “average” degree of EU involvement in the overall
Money and …nance chapter as inconsistent with our normative priors.
The EU involvement in Education, research and culture appears justi…ably
limited. Though signi…cant emphasis is devoted to this in the Treaties, the
e¤ect of this is diluted in the overall indexes by the fact that the legislature
and Court activity is practically nil. We also noted that the EU devotes a
considerable amount of …nancial and sta¤ resources to it which seems uncalled
for. On the whole, our numbers suggest a case for strictly limiting the EU
policy initiatives in the areas to the sole areas in which a strong externality
argument can be made.
We also …nd broad accordance with priors in the area of Business (non-
sectoral) policies. There is here a good balance of Treaty basis, legislative ac-
tivity, and Court support. The historical developments in our indicators clearly
show that the decade of the 1990s has been decisive for the enhancement of
the extent and intensity of EU action in this …eld, notably in the sub-areas of
competition and state-aid control. This progress appears to us fully consistent
with economic arguments, given, inter alia, the shortcomings of much of the na-
tional legislation in this …eld and the increasingly continental and indeed global
nature of business competition. Non-sectoral business relations are, indeed, a
key complement of the common market if applied in a competition enhancing
way.
The …rst and most obvious area where our normative priors seem to con‡ict
with present arrangements is Agriculture. Mentioned only in broad terms in
the Treaties, this area jumps to the top of the list for EU involvement due
to an intensive use of secondary legislation and to a more limited extent Court
activity. The exceedingly high value of the semi-aggregate indicator of legislation
intensity in agriculture (4.46 times the average) simply re‡ects the fact (shown
in Table 6) that over 40 percent of the EU secondary legislation today in force
concerns agriculture. In addition to that, agriculture absorbs the lion share of
the EU …nancial resources. In light of our results, some fundamental rethinking
25The relatively strong EU involvement in indirect taxation, not re‡ected in our detailed
numbers but which comes out of a more careful look at legislation and Court activity, in
conjunction with plans for further co-ordination in other areas (e.g. capital income taxes)
may suggest some concern.
19seems warranted. On the contrary, among the other areas of sectoral policy
(Industry, Transport), we see no signi…cant issue raised by our evidence.26
We also …nd similar inconsistencies in the area of Citizen and Social Pro-
tection. It is hard to see reasons against a fairly decentralized scheme of policy
management, delegated to local and national authorities. The degree of EU in-
volvement is instead surprisingly strong, due to extensive Treaty provisions but
also to a signi…cant support of secondary legislation and particularly the Court
of Justice. The latest Treaties have strengthened the base for EU social policies
to include “human resource, social protection and social inclusion” (Maastricht)
and employment promotion (Amsterdam). Provisions like working hours and
labor protection regulation, layo¤ rules, co-determination at the workplace seem
unnecessary in a single market framework and quite outside the scope of what
needs to be dealt with at the supranational level27.
We …nd the judgement on the Environment chapter complex. On the one
side, the presence of supra-national externalities calls for supra-national solu-
tions. However, the presence of national/local aspects points to potential syn-
ergy between di¤erent levels of governance, among which the EU should …nd its
place. According to our data, the EU involvement is very limited. Judging from
the EU treaties, the mandate of the EU is rather general and by no means re-
stricted to international environmental challenges. EU intervention seems to be
justi…ed also as means to strengthen the Common Market through the creation
of a levelled regulatory playing …eld. We feel this policy area could usefully be
developed further in areas where supra-national solutions are needed.
The degree of EU-level involvement in the area of International relations is
rather limited, according to our summary data. The normative case is mixed.
There are clear arguments for centralization in certain areas such as defence
or diplomacy, where economies of scale and specialization are likely to be an
advantage. In other areas included in this category, such as foreign aid, such a
case does not seem to exist, unless one sees foreign aid mainly as a complement
of foreign policy. Moreover, foreign policy itself may still display non-negligible
di¤erences in ”tastes” across EU member countries.28
8 Conclusions
We have attempted in this paper an empirical investigation aimed at deter-
mining the role played by the European Union (European Council, Parliament,
Commission, Court of Justice, etc.), in a number of policy areas. To this aim
we have constructed indicators of “policy involvement” based on the extent to
which the EU role is mandated in the Treaties, regulated through secondary leg-
islation, or enforced via the European Court of Justice. We have then compared
26The Treaties provide for some common transport policy, concerning e.g. the the provision
of supra-national public goods (cross-border roads), but this has not developed very far.
27For reasons similar to ours, Boeri (2000) argues in favor of maintaining unanimity for EU
decisions on social policy.
28See Alesina and Dollar (2000) on this point.
20our results with certain priors concerning the desirable degree of supranational
allocation of policy responsibilities. We based these priors on three elements:
the recent theoretical literature; our own views as to the relative advantages of
centralisation or decentralisation of each policy area; the results from an opinion
survey. These criteria pointed in the same direction.
Our conclusion is that the allocation of EU policy prerogatives is partly
inconsistent with normative criteria for the proper assignment of policies at dif-
ferent government levels. The EU is too involved in certain areas were economy
od scale seem low and heterogeneity of preferences high and not involved enough
in others, which, in principle, should have the opposite characteristics.
Our research should be extended in several directions. First, our empirical
measures used a particular source of information on the role of the EU as a
policy-maker, namely, that resulting from the letter of the Treaties and the leg-
islative/judicial activity. This seems to us a su¢ciently broad basis. Within this
framework, our approach here consisted of simple counting. We have already
stressed its limitations in section 2, concluding that for this reason our evidence
should be seen as complementary to other sources of information. Second, we
have adopted the important assumption that the EU role can be gauged from
its own acts alone, rather than also indirectly by the policies conducted by na-
tional states. But we know that much EU legislation today constrains national
legislation, especially via the use of directives and decisions. If most national
legislation is in‡uenced by Brussels, via legislation or Court decisions, then our
estimates of policy involvement are to be seen as (perhaps much) lower bounds
of the actual role of the EU. National legislation should be examined in order to
clarify this. Finally, the judgement of the “public good” nature of each policy
chapters could be improved. This would require measuring the externalities
and spillovers of policies across national states. One would also need to mea-
sure asymmetries of preferences over policies. It is hard to think of empirical
analyses, however accurate, that can shed complete light on these questions, but
an e¤ort in this direction seems worthwhile. A wealth of indirect information
(voting behavior, consumer preferences, survey measures more extensive than
the ones explored here, etc.) could be exploited.
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23Statistical Annex
All data relating to the number of legislation acts issued and in force have
been gathered from the European Commission website Celex. This website
(http://europa.eu.int/celex/) provides access to all European legislation and
enables the user to search through them using a variety of criteria. In par-
ticular, Celex classi…es documents according to subcategories which have been
regrouped to obtain our classi…cation in policy chapters.
Data on Court cases were retrieved from the European Court of Justice web
site search fazcility under http://curia.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en.
Subject categories were reclassi…ed to make them consistent with our policy
chapters.
The following search patterns have been used to obtain our data:
Table 3: Number of Directives, Decision and Regulations in L series retrieved
by means of a standard search, second menu (“legislative acts”).
The historical data on EU expenditures were obtained from the publication
Vademecum 2000 ”The facts in …gures ” by the European Commission under
http://europa.eu.int/comm/budget/pdf/budget/syntchif2001/en.pdf.
Table 4: All numbers were obtained by means of ”standard” searches with
restrictions by date and subject. Legislative acts were then classi…ed according
to their content (see Annex Table).
Table 5: Numbers on international agreements and recommendations and
opinions were obtained by means of ”expert” searches with restrictions by form,
subject and date. White and Green Papers were obtained from EU web site.
Non-binding acts and documents were then classi…ed according to their content
into the de…ned policy chapters (see Annex Table).
Table 6: Articles in the Treaties were classi…ed according to their content
(see Annex Table).
Table 7: All numbers were obtained by means of “expert” searches with
restrictions by form, date and subject. Legislative acts were classi…ed according
to their content (see Annex Table).
Tables 8: Court case numbers were retrieved from the EU Court of Jus-
tice website. Court cases were classi…ed according to their content (see Annex
Table).
Table 9: Numbers on international agreements and recommendations and
opinions were obtained by means of “expert” searches with restrictions by form,
subject and date. White and Green Papers were obtained from EU web site.
They were classi…ed according to their content (see Annex Table).
The sta¤ numbers broken down by policy chapters were provided by the
DG-Personnel and Administration of the European Commission. It regards
24the sta¤ as of 01/03/2001, including temporary posts. The EU administra-
tive expenditures (4703.7 mil.EUR) have been allocated to the policy chap-
ters/administration/other institutions pro-quota according to the sta¤ size.
Table 10: compiled from previous tables.
25Table 1
Policy Domains Externalities Pref. Assymmetry Devolution
1 International Trade High Low EU/Global
2 Common Market High Low EU
3 Money & Finance Med./High ? National/EU
4 Education, Res & Culture Low High Local/National
5 Environment Med./High High National/EU/Global
6 Bus. Relations (Sectoral) Low High National
7 Bus. Relations (Non-Sectoral) High ? EU/Global
8 International Relations Med./High Low National/EU
9 Citizen & Social Protection Low High Local/NationalTable 2:  Desired allocation of policy responsibilities: the results from Eurobarometer
Hypothetical
B DK D GR E F IRL I L NL A P FIN S UK Maximum Minimum Mean Median Council votes
in favour of EU
responsibility
1
1 International trade n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
2 Common market n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
3 Money and finance  46 -14 16 36 31 30 34 59 51 42 10 -4 -15 -39 -46 59 -46 16 30 62
4 Education, research, culture  -8 -38 -14 -9 -1 -7 -9 14 1 -10 -23 -25 -18 -36 -21 14 -38 -13 -10 12
5 Environment  28 7 35 24 33 33 10 28 20 44 2 -6 -14 -5 -10 44 -14 15 20 66
6 Business relation, sectoral n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
6a   Agriculture and fishery  30 -8 20 -15 3 9 6 -1 14 30 -30 -26 -44 -28 -15 30 -44 -4 -1 43
6b   Industry and energy n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
6c   Transport n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
7 Busin. non-sect. (compet/subs/comp law) n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
8 International relations & foreign aid  43 -1 32 5 32 36 23 47 29 36 10 1 -19 -21 2 47 -21 17 23 77
9 Citizen and social protection  n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
9a Migration 32 -18 5 3 26 34 -3 46 7 36 -18 -13 -32 -12 -16 46 -32 5 3 55
9b Crime - local -26 -58 -20 -9 -18 -22 -34 -6 -12 -23 -25 -29 -39 -56 -46 -6 -58 -28 -25 0
9c Crime - global 49 32 48 20 41 49 24 44 44 49 37 13 28 27 3 49 3 34 37 87
9d Health and social welfare -30 -65 -31 0 -27 -41 -28 -7 -26 -29 -45 -27 -76 -78 -36 0 -78 -36 -30 0
9e Unemployment, social exclusion, reg. aid 26 5 24 24 32 19 23 37 32 9 15 0 -3 2 -1 37 -3 16 19 74
Mean across domains  25 -12 16 8 18 18 10 28 21 25 -6 -12 -22 -25 -18
Total 19 -16 12 8 15 14 5 26 16 18 -7 -12 -23 -25 -19
Source: Eurobarometer, spring 2001, section 5.1
The table reports the balance of answers (S-N). (1-U/100), where: S = percentage of respondents favouring shared responsibility between EU and national authorities; N = percentage of respondents
 favouring national responsibility; U = undecided; n.a.: survey results not available. See text for further details.
1
Number of votes that would be cast in favour of EU responsibility if Council members voted according to survey replies (majority = 44; qualified majority = 62 votes; unanimity=87 votes)Table 3:  EU activities; 1971-2000
1971-75 1976-19801981-19851986-19901991-19951996-2000
No. of Directives  108 264 330 537 566 532
No. of Regulations  1788 4022 6106 9124 7752 5583
No. of Decisions 716 2122 2591 3251 4242 5299
Total No. of "domestic" legal acts 2612 6408 9027 12912 12560 11414
No. of Court Decisions 693 1155 1760 2127 2027 2487
No. of International Agreements  454 488 517 542 852 1223
No. of Recommendations and Opinions 68 114 95 143 1246 1505
No. of White and Green Papers 0 0 1 9 28 37
EU expenditure as % of EU GDP* 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1
EU expenditure as % of gov. expenditure 1.0 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.4
*last year of 5-year period only
Sources: See annex
Note: The data on legislative acts include all acts issued in the period, including those no longer in force today.Table 4:  Breakdown of EU legislation by policy domain: number of Regulations, Directives and Decisions
1971-75 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000
1 International trade 864 2573 2208 3416 2783 2041
2 Common market 133 251 184 268 305 529
3 Money and finance 49 69 98 65 100 249
4 Education, research, culture 15 40 73 104 180 136
5 Environment 29 61 98 131 197 255
6 Business relation, sectoral 1155 3051 5685 7281 7130 5437
6a   Agriculture and fishery 980 2479 5165 6880 6654 4907
6b   Industry and energy 109 445 408 300 309 370
6c   Transport 66 127 112 101 167 160
7 Busin. non-sect. (compet/subs/company law) 116 137 256 358 669 1406
8 International rels & foreign aid (wout intl. Trade) 155 100 162 768 426 501
9 Citizens and social protection 96 126 263 521 770 860
Total 2612 6408 9027 12912 12560 11414
Shares (% of column) 
1 International trade 33.1 40.2 24.5 26.5 22.2 17.9
2 Common market 5.1 3.9 2.0 2.1 2.4 4.6
3 Money and finance 1.9 1.1 1.1 0.5 0.8 2.2
4 Education, research, culture 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 1.4 1.2
5 Environment 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.6 2.2
6 Business relation, sectoral 44.2 47.6 63.0 56.4 56.8 47.6
6a   Agriculture and fishery 37.5 38.7 57.2 53.3 53.0 43.0
6b   Industry and energy 4.2 6.9 4.5 2.3 2.5 3.2
6c   Transport 2.5 2.0 1.2 0.8 1.3 1.4
7 Busin. non-sect. (compet/subs/company law) 4.4 2.1 2.8 2.8 5.3 12.3
8 International rels & foreign aid (wout intl. Trade) 5.9 1.6 1.8 5.9 3.4 4.4
9 Citizens and social protection 3.7 2.0 2.9 4.0 6.1 7.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: See annex
Note: The data include all acts issued in the period, including those no longer in force todayTable 5:  Breakdown of EU non-binding acts by policy domain
1971-75 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000
1 International trade 6 2 12 11 49 38
2 Common market 4 20 8 17 160 200
3 Money and finance 3 1 4 1 50 107
4 Education, research, culture 2 2 4 1 68 92
5 Environment 4 2 4 17 92 149
6 Business relation, sectoral 37 79 48 55 559 574
6a   Agriculture and fishery 5 5 2 11 183 148
6b   Industry and energy 1 13 13 26 273 311
6c   Transport 31 61 33 18 103 115
7 Busin. non-sect. (compet/subs/company law) 6 1 1 7 49 45
8 International rels & foreign aid (wout intl. Trade) 0 3 3 15 39 33
9 Citizens and social protection 6 4 11 19 180 267
Total 68 114 95 143 1246 1505
Note: The total number of documents may differ from the corresponding total in table 6a, since some documents
were released before 1971
1971-75 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000
1 International trade
2 Common market 1 1 1
3 Money and finance 2
4 Education, research, culture 1
5 Environment 1
6 Business relation, sectoral 1 3
6a   Agriculture and fishery
6b   Industry and energy 1
6c   Transport 3
7 Busin. non-sect. (compet/subs/company law) 1
8 International rels & foreign aid (wout intl. Trade) 1
9 Citizens and social protection 1 2
Total 0 0 1 1 6 8
1971-75 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000
1 International trade 1
2 Common market 4 7 4
3 Money and finance 1
4 Education, research, culture 3 2
5 Environment 1 2 3
6 Business relation, sectoral 1 4 4
6a   Agriculture and fishery 1
6b   Industry and energy 1 3
6c   Transport 3 1
7 Busin. non-sect. (compet/subs/company law) 2 7
8 International rels & foreign aid (wout intl. Trade) 1
9 Citizens and social protection 5 7
Total 0 0 0 8 22 29
Sources: see annex
Recommendations & opinions
White Papers
Green PapersTable 6:  Measures of policy intensity: the Treaties
Articles Words Articles Words Articles Words Articles Words
1 International trade 15 1454 0 0 0 0 15 1454
2 Common market 38 6057 0 0 0 0 38 6057
3 Money and finance 18 4335 0 0 0 0 18 4335
4 Education, research, culture 14 1614 0 0 0 0 14 1614
5 Environment 3 682 0 0 0 0 3 682
6 Business relation, sectoral 19 2285 0 0 86 14998 19 17283
6a   Agriculture and fishery 7 1072 0 0 0 0 7 1072
6b   Industry and energy 1 230 0 0 86 14998 1 15228
6c   Transport 11 983 0 0 0 0 11 983
7 Busin. non-sect. (compet/subs/company law) 11 1248 0 0 0 0 11 1248
8 International rels & foreign aid (wout intl. Trade) 7 752 18 2742 0 0 25 3494
9 Citizens and social protection 32 4133 14 2514 0 0 46 6647
Total 157 22560 32 5256 86 14998 189 42814
Shares (% of column) 
1 International trade 9.6 6.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.9 3.4
2 Common market 24.2 26.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.1 14.1
3 Money and finance 11.5 19.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.5 10.1
4 Education, research, culture 8.9 7.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.4 3.8
5 Environment 1.9 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 1.6
6 Business relation, sectoral 12.1 10.1 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 10.1 40.4
6a   Agriculture and fishery 4.5 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.7 2.5
6b   Industry and energy 0.6 1.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.5 35.6
6c   Transport 7.0 4.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 2.3
7 Busin. non-sect. (compet/subs/company law) 7.0 5.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 2.9
8 International rels & foreign aid (wout intl. Trade) 4.5 3.3 56.3 52.2 0.0 0.0 13.2 8.2
9 Citizens and social protection 20.4 18.3 43.8 47.8 0.0 0.0 24.3 15.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: See annex
Note: The counting of articles and words includes only those sections of the Treaties that are directly related to policies (i.e. excluding administrative and institutional aspects). 
See annex for details.
Total role in Treaties Steel & Coal and Euratom Treaties Treaty of European Union Treaty of European CommunityTable 7:  Measures of policy intensity: legislation in force
Regulation Directive Decision Total
1 International trade 1568 20 1216 2804
2 Common market 48 890 184 1122
3 Money and finance 58 77 138 273
4 Education, research, culture 22 19 94 135
5 Environment 66 193 188 447
6 Business relation, sectoral 3915 650 2738 7303
6a   Agriculture and fishery 3733 484 2245 6462
6b   Industry and energy 70 45 380 495
6c   Transport 112 121 113 346
7 Busin. non-sect. (compet/subs/company law) 73 38 2309 2420
8 International rels & foreign aid (wout intl. Trade) 222 1 258 481
9 Citizens and social protection 257 178 527 962
Total 6229 2066 7652 15947
Shares (% of column) 
1 International trade 25.2 1.0 15.9 17.6
2 Common market 0.8 43.1 2.4 7.0
3 Money and finance 0.9 3.7 1.8 1.7
4 Education, research, culture 0.4 0.9 1.2 0.8
5 Environment 1.1 9.3 2.5 2.8
6 Business relation, sectoral 62.9 31.5 35.8 45.8
6a   Agriculture and fishery 59.9 23.4 29.3 40.5
6b   Industry and energy 1.1 2.2 5.0 3.1
6c   Transport 1.8 5.9 1.5 2.2
7 Busin. non-sect. (compet/subs/company law) 1.2 1.8 30.2 15.2
8 International rels & foreign aid (wout intl. Trade) 3.6 0.0 3.4 3.0
9 Citizens and social protection 4.1 8.6 6.9 6.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: See annex
All signatoriesTable 8:  Measures of policy intensity: Court activity (from June 1997 to March 2001)
Judgements Opinions Total
1 International trade 139 70 209
2 Common market 218 206 424
3 Money and finance 105 123 228
4 Education, research, culture 1 0 1
5 Environment 70 59 129
6 Business relation, sectoral 248 130 378
6a   Agriculture and fishery 214 106 320
6b   Industry and energy 2 0 2
6c   Transport 32 24 56
7 Busin. non-sect. (compet/subs/company law) 317 116 433
8 International rels & foreign aid (wout intl. Trade) 44 28 72
9 Citizens and social protection 123 85 208
Total 1265 817 2082
Shares (% of column) 
1 International trade 11.0 8.6 10.0
2 Common market 17.2 25.2 20.4
3 Money and finance 8.3 15.1 11.0
4 Education, research, culture 0.1 0.0 0.0
5 Environment 5.5 7.2 6.2
6 Business relation, sectoral 19.6 15.9 18.2
6a   Agriculture and fishery 16.9 13.0 15.4
6b   Industry and energy 0.2 0.0 0.1
6c   Transport 2.5 2.9 2.7
7 Busin. non-sect. (compet/subs/company law) 25.1 14.2 20.8
8 International rels & foreign aid (wout intl. Trade) 3.5 3.4 3.5
9 Citizens and social protection 9.7 10.4 10.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: See annexTable 9:  Other measures of policy intensity: international agreements, non-binding legislation, papers, staff & budget
International Recommendations White Green Staff EU
agreements & opinions papers papers size
1 expenditure
2
1 International trade 4521 130 0 1 372 55
2 Common market 11 454 3 15 330 194
3 Money and finance 1 168 2 1 682 100
4 Education, research, culture 101 172 1 5 3821 5064
5 Environment 3 268 1 6 410 218
6 Business relation, sectoral 833 1385 4 9 2521 42940
6a   Agriculture and fishery 735 361 0 1 1036 41744
6b   Industry and energy 44 649 1 4 958
6c   Transport 54 375 3 4 21
7 Busin. non-sect. (compet/subs/company law) 5 129 1 9 1095 364
8 International rels & foreign aid (wout intl. Trade) 426 94 1 1 2061 8481
9 Citizens and social protection 28 498 3 12 1483 33039
Memo: administration
3 10214 1498
Memo: other Community institutions4 9074 1331
Total 5929 3298 16 59 32063 93284
Shares (% of column) 
1 International trade 76.3 3.9 0.0 1.7 1.2 0.1
2 Common market 0.2 13.8 18.8 25.4 1.0 0.2
3 Money and finance 0.0 5.1 12.5 1.7 2.1 0.1
4 Education, research, culture 1.7 5.2 6.3 8.5 11.9 5.5
5 Environment 0.1 8.1 6.3 10.2 1.3 0.2
6 Business relation, sectoral 14.0 42.0 25.0 15.3 7.9 46.7
6a   Agriculture and fishery 12.4 10.9 0.0 1.7 3.2 45.4
6b   Industry and energy 0.7 19.7 6.3 6.8 0.0 1.0
6c   Transport 0.9 11.4 18.8 6.8 0.0 0.0
7 Busin. non-sect. (compet/subs/company law) 0.1 3.9 6.3 15.3 3.4 0.4
8 International rels & foreign aid (wout intl. Trade) 7.2 2.9 6.3 1.7 6.4 9.2
9 Citizens and social protection 0.5 15.1 18.8 20.3 4.6 35.9
Memo: administration 31.9 1.6
Memo: other Community institutions 28.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: See annex
Note: Slight discrepancies in the total numbers with respect with table 3 are due to the difference in the time periods considered.
1. Staff size as of 01/03/2001, included temporary posts.
2. The EU administrative expenditures (4703.7 mil.EUR) have been allocated to the policy domains according to staff size.
3. "Administration" includes the Commission, Secretariat-General, Legal service, Press and communication service, External relations,
Personnel and Administration, Budget, Financial Control, European Anti-Fraud Office, Joint Interpreting and Conference Service,
Translation Service, Office for Official Publications of the EC, Representations in the EU.
4. "Other Community  institutions" include Parliament (4126), Council (2648), Court of Justice (1006), Court of Auditors (552), 
Economic and Social Committee  and Committee of the Regions (742).Table 10: Involvement of the EU in policy making:  measures of intensity by policy chapter
Treaty Legislation Court Arithmetic Geometric Leontief Treaty Legislation Court Mean
1 International trade 0.62 1.93 1.10 1.22 1.30 1.54 6.00 2.00 5.00 4.3
2 Common market 1.88 0.77 2.24 1.63 1.89 1.86 3.00 4.00 2.00 3.0
3 Money and finance 1.08 0.19 1.20 0.82 0.96 0.89 5.00 10.00 4.00 6.3
4 Education, research, culture 0.61 0.09 0.01 0.24 0.05 0.01 7.00 11.00 11.00 9.7
5 Environment 0.17 0.31 0.68 0.39 0.44 0.34 11.00 8.00 7.00 8.7
6 Business relation, sectoral
6a   Agriculture and fishery 0.34 4.46 1.69 2.16 2.21 2.36 10.00 1.00 3.00 4.7
6b   Industry and energy 1.99 0.34 0.01 0.78 0.12 0.01 2.00 6.00 10.00 6.0
6c   Transport 0.45 0.24 0.30 0.33 0.35 0.41 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.0
7 Busin. non-sect. (compet/subs/company law) 0.48 1.67 2.29 1.48 1.72 1.50 8.00 3.00 1.00 4.0
8 International rels & foreign aid (wout intl. Trade) 1.18 0.33 0.38 0.63 0.59 0.53 4.00 7.00 8.00 6.3
9 Citizens and social protection 2.19 0.66 1.10 1.32 1.37 1.54 1.00 5.00 6.00 4.0
Average: 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
(1): Indicators are normalised so that the columns average equals unity.
Sources: see annex
Basic Indicators (1) Means (1) RankTable 11
Policy Domains Externalities Pref. Assymmetry Devolution EU Role
1 International Trade High Low EU/Global Large
2 Common Market High Low EU Large
3 Money & Finance Med./High ? National/EU Medium
4 Education, Res & Culture Low High Local/National Small
5 Environment Med./High High National/EU/Global Small
6 Bus. Relations(Sectoral) Low High National
6a Agriculture … … … Large
6b Industry … … … Small
6c Transport … … … Small
7 Bus. Relations (Non-Sectoral) High ? EU/Global Large
8 International Relations Med./High Low National/EU Small
9 Citizen & Social Protection Low High Local/National LargeAnnex Table:  Sources for measuring policy intensity
  Policy chapters and sub-chapters and corresponding categories/chapters in European Treaties,
  Celex database of legislation, and in the European Court of Justice website
Treaty of the Euro- European Steel and  Treaty on the European Treaty of the Celex categories Court of Justice
pean Communities Coal Treaty Atomic Energy Community European Union website categories
1 International trade  Articles 23-30, 131-135, 184, 185
  International agreements etc. 11.30.10-30, 11.4, 11.6, 11.70.30 commercial policy, Assoc. of Overseas Countries & Territories
  Goods/customs duties 02 free movement of goods
2 Common market Articles 31, 39-50, 56-69, 87-97
  Internal market related legislation 13.3 Community Trade Mark, approximation of laws
  Services/establishment right 06 freedom to provide services
  Capital 10.4 free movement of capital
  People 20.1 free movement of persons
3 Money and finance Articles 98-115
  Monetary policies 10.2
  Other economic 10.1, 10.3 economic policy
  Taxation  09 taxation
4 Education, research and culture Articles 163-173, 149-151 16 research, information, education, statistics
5 Environment Articles 174-176 15.1 (from envinronment and consumers) 
6 Sectoral
6a Agriculture and Fisheries Articles 32-38
  Agriculture 03 ECSC, EAEC, agriculture
  Fisheries 04
6b Industry and Energy Article 157 Articles 1-6, 46-75 Articles 1-2, 4-51
  Energy 12 energy
  Industrial policy (steel etc.) 13 except 13.3 industrial policy
6c Transport Articles 70-80 07 transport
7 Business non sectoral Articles 51-55, 81-86
  Undertakings law 17 law related to undertakings, intellectual property
  Competition  08 except 8.6 competition
  Subsidies 8.6 state aid
8 International rels & foreign aid (wout intl. Trade) Articles 177-183 Articles 11-28
  Multilateral co-operation, embargos 11.1, 11.2, 11.30.40, 11.30.50, 11.30.60, 11.30.70 external relations, new accesions
  Foreign policy, defence  18 common foreign and security policy
  Foreign aid 11.5, 11.7 except 11.70.30
9 Citizen & social protection Articles 125-130, 136-148, 152-156, 158-162, 186-188 Articles 29-42
  Freedom, society justice  19, 20.2 justice and home affairs, european citizenship
  Consumer/health protection 15.2, 15.3, 15.4  (from envinronment and consumers) 
  Labor protection, empl., socsec 05 social policy
  Regional policies 14 regional policies, economic and social cohesion